The Hague -- Walter Slocombe, the U.S. under secretary of defense, defended the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) position with respect to nuclear weapons, telling a Dutch interviewer December 4 that the German government is free to raise the question of no first use of nuclear weapons, but that the United States feels that NATO's current policy is not in need of change.

Interview with U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe by Arie Elshout, Chief Foreign Desk Editor, De Volkskrant, December 4, 1998, Residence of U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands, The Hague, The Netherlands

...But they say there are no risks now, so why should we keep the possibility of first use?

A: Because it is true and a very good thing, that in twenty years we've gone from a Soviet Union as a major military threat to Europe, to Russia, and a whole series of states, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Belarus, Moldova, other countries as partners in security. Unfortunately, during that same period of time, we've seen the emergence of new threats from rogue states. We are all worried about Iraq and its capacity to build chemical weapons. It has chemical weapons, and it has the capacity to produce biological weapons. It had chemical weapons in 1991. We don't know if it has retained some of them. It had biological weapons in 1991. We don't know if it has retained some of those. It was very far on in its nuclear program. It had capacity to build long range missiles. That's now been constrained, but the capacity is still there. Iran is actively working on both nuclear and chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them over very long ranges. Iran clearly has a nuclear weapons program and they had chemical weapons. They used them during the Iran-Iraq war after they were attacked by Iraq. They are building long range missiles. Libya has an active program. Syria has an active program. I don't mean that any of these countries are going to attack the countries in NATO tomorrow, or even rule out the possibility that there could be other countries, but it seems to me it would be highly foolish for the alliance to say, if it were attacked, say in advance try and assure an aggressor that if you did attack using these terrible weapons -- you would not run the risk of being responded to with nuclear weapons. It is simply an issue of making sure that we continue to maintain a high level of uncertainty or high level of concern, if you will, at what the potential aggressor would face if he used these weapons or indeed took other aggressive acts against the alliance. I challenge the proposition that the threat is gone. A different threat...

Some people say that you are exaggerating the threat of these countries to justify maintaining the first-use...

A: I don't think we're exaggerating the threat at all. They're just the facts. There is no question that Iran is working on long range missiles. There is no question that they have a nuclear program. Fortunately, it's fairly far down the road. There's no question they have some kind of chemical program. Iraq admittedly had both chemical and biological weapons programs and in 1991 actually had weapons to put on missiles. They have the capacity to build long range missiles. Syria has an active chemical weapons program. Libya has an active chemical weapons program. I don't think there is any reasonable dispute that these threats exist. We've seen chemicals used. Even in Europe there was an attack by a terrorist group. There was a terrorist attack in the Paris subway system using chemical weapons. It demonstrates the capabilities do exist. Furthermore, North Korea is developing all these systems and North Korea is also very much into the export business.

We have heard that you would prefer that the issue not be addressed. Are you afraid of the debate?

A: I'm not afraid of the debate, because I think that in any fair-minded debate on these issues people, including quite possibly Foreign Minister Fischer, who is a very sensible and responsible figure and a part of a sensible and responsible government, will come to agree that the current policy is a wise one. And we'll come back to an aspect of that in a moment. I do think there is a danger that a big public debate over these issues will distract from the real issues of how we restructure NATO, how we make NATO better able to meet the challenges that it faces in the next century. The point I wanted to make is that, I haven't had the opportunity to discuss this or hear it discussed with Fischer. We did discuss it with the German Defense Minister Scharping when he was in Washington and he made a point which I think is a very valid one: which is there is a distinction between a long term aspiration to see a world in which nuclear weapons don't exist, to see a world in which nuclear threats are not a part of national policy -- and the current problem of making for NATO day-to-day, for here and now, a real-world defense strategy. And that I think is a valid distinction. The U.S. is after all committed ultimately to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of general disarmament. That's not going to happen soon, but it a valid aspiration. My point is that this is not an issue of asking the new German government to repudiate a fundamental principle. It is an issue of the new German government looking at the situation and deciding whether it is in its interest and the alliance's interest to have a large-scale debate over these issues in the context of current policy.

Can you trust the new German government, because Schroeder has said they have the right to open the debate?

A: There's no question that they had the right to open the debate if they want to do it. And there's no question that these are legitimate issues, and I think, right across German politics, in a whole succession of German governments, there has been in some sense a greatly respected modern tradition, if you will, of anti-militarism in Germany. There's a requirement for an effective defense and a requirement for an effective alliance and there is a requirement for nuclear deterrence as a part of that alliance. What Scharping said while he was in Washington was that the new German government has no desire to question these core principles of NATO.

There is a contradiction because Scharping said at one time that it is a long-term aspiration, but on the other hand, they succeeded after four weeks in power to turn it into a debate in the alliance.

A: One of the other things that Scharping emphasized when he was in Washington, was that the German government has not made a decision on how it chooses to handle this issue. It is, I think, appropriate for the rest of us to wait for the German government to make that decision before we engage on our side formally in the discussion.

Is it an U.S. nightmare to again have to deal with a German foreign minister who follows a different policy than the Chancellor?

A: The U.S. will work with the policy of any German government. It is up to them to make their decisions about what issues they want to raise, when they want to raise them, in what context, and how.

Are you not afraid that other countries will follow suit?

A: I'm not afraid of any of these issues being debated. I do think there is a strong argument that it's not useful given the real important issues that may also be addressed to spend a lot of time on these issues. Those of us who believe that NATO has basically the right strategy in general and with respect to nuclear weapons, have nothing to fear from the debate. We are not trying to avoid the debate. I would prefer that we focus on the issues that are the real central issues: European defense identity, preparing NATO to deal with the new kinds of challenges that we face, building the NATO Russian relations, integrating the new members of the alliance, reaching out to new members, building NATO's own defense capabilities. Those seem to me to be the issues that we really should be debating, because they do represent the challenges we face today rather than the challenges of fifteen or twenty years ago.

Do you think that the new member states will support the German line?

A: I don't want to speculate on what position any individual country will take as such. But I do think that countries which are conscious of the fact that they face continued security problems in Europe, particularly potentially with weapons of mass destruction, but even in other contexts, will have to recognize that NATO's doctrine, which does no more than reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to these terrible threats and forms of aggression. I think that all the countries in the alliance will come to agree as they did in 1991 that this is the right policy.

Do you think that NATO should respond with nuclear weapons to threats?

A: I'm not necessarily saying that NATO should use nuclear weapons in response to a threat or use of chemical or biological weapons against some non-member country, although I wouldn't totally rule that out. The issue here is not that but what NATO would say about responding to threats to its own members. It's all very well to say we don't have to worry about say, Libyan chemical weapons because we're in Northern Europe. However, there is no question that within a decade or two decades at the most many of these countries will have the capability with missiles and airplanes or by terrorist methods to use these weapons against targets in Europe.

Is it possible that if Libya or Iraq fires at another target in the Middle East that NATO will retaliate?

A: That's a whole different issue from the question of no first-use. The no first-use debate is about whether NATO is going to try and reassure potential aggressors that they do not face a set of risks that if they had to face them would have a strong deterrent effect, and that would be very stupid. The other issue is what NATO should do about those that develop weapons of mass destruction, much less their possible use in areas on the periphery of NATO's interests. I think that if they do that doesn't necessarily mean we should go out and drop NATO nuclear weapons. But I do think there will be a big distinction between saying: I'm not sure I would use nuclear weapons in these contexts and saying these problems are none of NATO's business.

But what if other members also believe that it would be dragged in?

A: First of all, remember that by definition NATO as such can not do anything without the agreement of all of its members. So if the German government or the American government or the Dutch government or any other government who's in the alliance says this is something that is not in our interest, too dangerous, too risky or too costly, or illegal, they have the power to stop NATO from acting. There's no question of NATO being dragged into anything if a single member state doesn't want NATO to do it...

USIA 12/11/98