No. 6. (22/03/96) - 1.     OSCE and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Peace Agreement

  At their Budapest meeting on 7-8 December, 1995, the foreign ministers of the OSCE states accepted a request from the Dayton negotiating parties that the organization participate in securing peace, democracy and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Upon the request, the foreign ministers decided that OSCE was going to supervise the preparations for and the implementation and monitoring of the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections when conditions would provide for the polling. OSCE will strictly oversee the observation of human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will designate an ombudsman for the region. It will promote arms control, confidence and security building talks between the parties, the implementation and supervision of treaties concluded, so as to advance long term stability at a lower level of armaments.
  OSCE has been making preparations to establish its mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the period of the next year. The Sarajevo based central office will be assisted by 30 branches and delegations.

No. 6. (22/03/96) - 2.     UK Study on Hungarian Control of the Armed Forces

  British Report on the Organization and Civil Control of Hungarian Army On the basis of an agreement between the UK Defense Secretary and the Hungarian Defense Minister (April, 1995), a 70-page study on the parliamentary supervision and democratic, civil control of the Hungarian Army has been prepared by the Methodology and Adviser Services Directorate of the UK Defense Secretariat.
The main conclusions of the British sponsored inquiry include:

1. A significant progress in the democratic and civil control of the armed forces has taken place during the past six years. The legal, constitutional framework of the control has been prepared.

2. The interconnection between the Ministry of Defense and the Army Headquarters is not similar to any NATO model, which hampers effective contacts with individual command levels of the NATO partners. There are many unnecessary parallels in the two organizations.

3. The establishment of a board of civil experts delegated to the Minister of Defense is necessary to help his decision making on issues of defense policy and to determine long-term strategies of national security.

4. There are few civil personnel trained on and dealing with security and defense issues in the Ministry of Defense. The report admits that amid the recent salary payment conditions in the civil service, the situation is rather difficult to improve.

5. The report suggests an organizational reform in the Ministry of Defense and an advance toward the Western European model of integration, in which military and civilian aims and considerations complement and counterweight each other.

  As for the supervisory role of the Parliament over the Hungarian Army, the report concludes that defense doctrine should not be worked out by the Parliament. It should only declare the principles instead. Though overregulation is defendable during the recent transition, in the longer term, it could prevent the Army from operating normally. Parliamentary consensus on defense policy is of immense importance. Among control mechanisms, the report stresses the role of budgetary control. Beside the achievements, the following deficiencies are mentioned:

1. a lack of middle- and long-term planning;

2. the manner of introduction and structure of the budget thwart MPs in effective controlling. The budget should be submitted in greater detail;

3. the Ministry of Defense does not exercise effective control over the justifiability and efficiency of military demands;

4. a lack of regular contrasting of investments and accomplishments;

5. the structure of budgetary planning should be made more transparent and harmonized with NATO standard Defense Planning Questionnaire as Hungary is seeking NATO membership.