No. 3. (16/02/96)        RUSSIA  AND  NATO

The mainly emotional-psychological attitude of the Russian military leadership toward NATO enlargement is one of complete rejection. They consider the enlargement as an act rooted in the former logic of blocks, which is aimed at the creation of a one-pole world, and the conservation of Western military superiority. Military experts generally hold the view that the nature of NATO has not changed, and they consider it - in line with traditional Soviet opinion - an agressive, anti-Russian military block serving US interests. As a result, NATO enlargement would not provide for collective security but collective defence, ie the formation of hostile Eurasian blocks.

The Russian rejection of NATO is based on the consideration that Russia has lost an important geostrategic region and considerable geopolitical positions in a dramatically short period of time. She was forced back from Magdeburg to Smolensk by 1,500 kilometers without losing a war, and has no further territories to surrender. Her strategic positions have weakened significantly both in Europe and Asia, and serious inequality has appeared between Russian and US means and chances of interest enforcement. The US - partly via NATO - is able to maintain her interests even outside the American continent; Russia is potent at best over her own territory.

The opinion of the foreign policy leadership is in theory identical with that of the military, but more flexible. The political leadership is aware of the need of cooperation with NATO. They are also aware of the fact that the conflicts most important to the West and especially to the US (nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, the South-slav conflict, islamic fundamentalism) cannot be addressed without Russian political and diplomatic support. Thus the West and the US in particular desperately needs a cooperative, democratic, stable and friendly partner power.
The policy of concentrating on Russian concerns vis a vis NATO enlargement has proved quite successful, especially with the US, since Washington, under the pressure of the budget deficit and the Republican Congress, is in need of a "cheap" solution. The recent personal changes in Russia (Primakov's designation as foreign minister) do not mean a toughening of policies, but rather a pragmatic, possibly professional closure and summary of the pending processes, and - in some cases - the introduction of rational elements in the debate (for example the reference to the 1990 agreement on the exclusion of the territory of the ex-GDR from NATO, as a precedent). The new leadership neither seeks new confrontation, nor wants to suffer further strategic defeats. At the same time it is definitely ready to take military-political actions in response to any geopolitical changes caused by an actual NATO enlargement.
Russia is able to put off but not to prevent enlargement. Her leaders are aware of their lack of tangible means to prevent a decided enlargement, though they can promote a postponement, which is considered by the West anyway. (NATO enlargement is not hampered particularly by Russian resistence to it but by processes inside NATO.) Russia is expected to set a high price for her open or tacit reconciliation.
Possible Russian demands are as follows:
a) the boundaries of an enlarged NATO are not to reach Russia (thus the Baltic states and Poland would be excluded);
b) the amendment of the agreement on conventional forces in Central Europe (CFE) based on the reason that it was concluded by the former Soviet Union in a substantially different military-political situation, and has left Russia weakened especially on the Southern wing;
c) a guarantee that there will be no stationing of foreign forces in the territory of the new member states;
d) a guarantee that there will be no stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of the new member states;
e) a compensation for the loss of the Central European military market - a reasonable market access;
f) a comprehensive agreement between NATO and Russia;
g) leaving NATO open to a possible future Russian membership;
h) the enlargement of G7 to G8 by incorporating Russia;
i) a transformation of OSCE into a two-level organization by the establishment of a UN-style "Security Council", which would provide Russia with a veto in European issues;
j) a not easily foreseeable demand for a substantial Western material compensation (capital investment).
In case of a unilateral, swift, "anti-Russian" NATO enlargement the Russian countermeasures could be serious, but in their long term effect limited and vanishing. Russia would denounce CFE, revise or not ratify the nuclear weapons agreements, develop new weapon systems. She would install nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad region, and quit Partnership for Peace. She would try to destabilize the applicant countries in Central Europe and discredit their political elites before the West (see the Oleksy scandal in Poland). That is, European security would significantly deteriorate, though no confrontation would take place.
The destabilization efforts by Moscow aimed at the political elites (not only the former communists and Socialist Party members!) should be met in time by reaching a consensus between the parliamentary parties in order to avoid the selfish exploitation of such attempts and the erosion of the country's integration potentials.