No. 34 (14/11/97) - 1 Statement by the Permanent Chairman of NATO's Conference of
National Armaments Directors
Three important meetings have just been successfully held at NATO Headquarters this week, which testify to the important role being played by the armaments community of NATO and of Partner countries in the new security environment. The first two meetings were attended by delegations from Partner countries.
On November 4, NATO's Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) held a joint meeting with delegations from 15 Partner nations - Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Ukraine. NIAG is developing a defence industrial dialogue with Partners, and a practical example of this was the agreement reached to pursue a first joint NIAG prefeasibility study with Partners on "Fire Resistance for future Naval Ships. The study, which should commencein February 1998, will call upon industrial experts from 6 Partner and 9 NATO nations, and will be carried out by three technical teams under the Chairmanship of France, with a Deputy Chairman from Poland.
The following day, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana gave the opening address to a meeting of NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors ( CNAD) with Partner Delegations from Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrghyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Following a review of the new NATO, and its role in Euro - Atlantic security, Mr. Solana praised the armaments community of the allies and of their Partners for their important contribution to the new missions of the Alliance, and to the enhancement of Partnership for Peace. The meeting discussed a number of initiatives, including the identification of possible small - scale armaments cooperation projects, to be proposed by the Partners themselves, and developed within the armaments structures of the Alliance.
On November 6, the National Armaments Directors of NATO member countries , under the Chairmanship of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support, Mr. Norman W. Ray, met in plenary session in their customary Autumn Conference. Two main subjects dominated their discussion - Alliance Ground Surveillance and the NATO Armaments Review.
Member nations have been working actively together to explore the possibilities for an ambitious cooperative programme to provide a NATO - wide Ground Surveillance Capability. Both for crisis management and for the political and military conduct of operations generally ( including peacekeeping). military commanders need an effective picture of the ground situation, complementary to the one that AWACS provides for the air picture.
As a result of the meeting, Armaments Directors have directed their Provisional Project Structure to intensively search for fresh concepts and acquisition options to meet the complete Alliance Ground Surveillance capability, and to report their findings to the April 1998 CNAD meeting. In so doing, CNAD reaffirmed the intention of nations to find a successful way ahead to support the Ministerial decision to pursue a minimum essential NATO -owned and operated core capability supplemented by interoperable national assets.
National Armaments Directors are in the process of conducting a " NATO Armaments Review", aimed at assessing the future role of the Alliance in armaments - related matters. Their objective is to ensure that NATO's armaments community remains fully responsive to the Alliance's new missions and military requirements in the new security environment. The CNAD approved a report concluding the first phase of thestudy, with agreement to focus their armaments activities in NATO more sharply on the key military requirements of the Alliance. They also intend to place yet more emphasis on ensuring broad based interoperability among Alliance forces, and between Alliance forces and Partners. In the second Phase of the study, to be completed by November 1998, the detailed mechanisms and processes required to bring these agreements into effect will be determined.
Press Release (97)137
No. 34 (14/11/97) - 2 Speech by the Secretary General at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin 7 November 1997
"NATO-Russia Relations at the Turn of the Century"
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure to be here with you today in the capital of united Germany. No other European city bears better testimony to the historic changes which have taken place on the European continent over the last decade. Where a few years ago walls, minefields and guard towers separated families and friends, we can now see Europe's biggest construction site.
Berlin, the former symbol of a divided continent, is now a symbol of Europe uniting.
Just as your city has changed dramatically, so too has NATO. Who would have predicted only a few years ago that we would one day invite former members of the Warsaw Pact to join the Alliance? And who could have imagined that NATO and Russia would come to a historic understanding and embark on a promising partnership?
In the Europe we live in today, conditions defining our security have changed irrevocably. The Chernobyl catastrophe brought this home physically to areas as far apart as the Black Forest and Lappland. Security encompasses much more than the absence of military threats. With the Iron Curtain gone forever, our stability is even more directly affected by the broader security situation in Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia. As Volker Rühe put it: We have to export stability lest we risk importing instability.
Before this century draws to a close, the Alliance will have three new members and enlargement of the European Union will also be well under way. These parallel developments are tangible evidence of a Europe becoming more and more closely intertwined.
In this new Europe the very concept of opposing sides or ideological confrontation has lost any precise meaning. The real challenges our countries face have become very similar. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe compete for trade, not territory; for more wealth, not more weapons. They have left the muddy trenches of past confrontation and set out to conquer a secure and peaceful future.
NATO was quick to grasp the new situation. At the London Summit in 1990, NATO launched a broad outreach programme with the goal of tying together all democracies on the European continent, including Russia, through ever-closer ties of cooperation and partnership. The London Summit also initiated a wide-ranging transformation of the Alliance itself. The Madrid Summit took our ambitious approach one step further. NATO is taking an active part in shaping a Europe that is undivided and at peace with itself. This includes enlargement of Alliance membership, an enhanced Partnership for Peace, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, and our new, distinct relationships with Russia and Ukraine.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Of all these breathtaking changes, the evolution of a fundamentally new relationship between the adversaries of the cold war, NATO and Russia, remains, to my mind, the most extraordinary.
For me personally, this process is inextricably linked to the memories of negotiating the Founding Act with Evgeny Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister. It took us five months, a time of utmost intensity, from the first round in a snow-covered dacha on the outskirts of Moscow to the warm spring day in May when, having worked through the night, we finally emerged from the negotiating table to tell the waiting journalists of our success.
Berlin is an appropriate place to reflect upon the reality and the potential of this new relationship. I am not thinking so much in geographical terms, although it is true that Berlin lies closer to Moscow than Brussels. Rather, I have in mind the centuries of history which have alternately opposed and united Germany and Russia in a changing, sometimes fateful relationship of crucial importance to the whole of Europe.
Russia is a country with vast natural resources. It is the main supplier of natural gas to Western Europe. Its economy offers huge possibilities to foreign investors. 160 million people represent an intellectual and scientific potential second to none. And Russia remains the strongest single military power in Europe.
These features add up to one overriding conclusion: I cannot conceive of any viable European security structure that does not include an important role and a place for Russia.
What kind of Russia? We have in mind a Russia whose people are prosperous and frequent visitors to our countries; a partner who shares our interest in trade and stability; and a neighbour who pursues its policies in a confident but transparent and peaceful manner. In a word: We want Russia at ease with itself and the world around it. NATO's cooperation with Russia reflects this inclusive approach. Let me recall some of the earlier milestones: Russia became a member of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and, after signing the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in 1994, accepted an Individual Partnership Programme, in 1995. A team of Russian officers has been working at NATO's Supreme Command in Belgium over the last two years. And, most importantly, Russia joined NATO Allies and partner countries in our common peacekeeping effort in Bosnia in early 1996.
As important as these milestones were, the NATO-Russia partnership nonetheless lacked an overarching framework and a basic understanding of where we were heading. Misconceptions lingered in the Russian leadership over the continuing purpose of NATO and over the Alliance's historic declaration at the Brussels Summit in early 1994 that new members would be welcome. Some even argued that enlargement and improved relations with Russia could never go hand in hand.
But Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are all caught in the whirlwind of globalization and growing interdependence. To us, therefore, opening NATO to new members and opening our minds to a new Russia followed the same path of reason and pointed towards the same goal: an undivided Europe.
NATO stood firm on its decision to welcome new members, in conformity with the requirements and obligations set out in the Washington Treaty. And we stood just as firmly by our conviction that Russia could become a valuable strategic partner in helping to build the stable Europe we seek. The result was the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris last May.
Chancellor Kohl spoke of the Founding Act as "visible proof that the division of Europe has now been overcome." It is indeed a document of undoubted political and historic significance, a door into the next century pushed wide open.
I believe that today NATO and Russia have not only an option to cooperate and confront common security challenges such as ethnic conflicts or nuclear proliferation but a responsibility to do so. We must therefore learn more about each other, we must speak to each other more regularly, we must continue to develop trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. The Founding Act has created a mechanism to do just that - consult, coordinate, and act jointly. Through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, it gives Russia a voice, not a veto on Alliance activities. Allied Foreign Ministers and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov already met for the first time in September and endorsed a vigorous NATO-Russia work programme. In New York, matters of topical concern were discussed such as the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the more general issue of peacekeeping operations. Building on this basis, we have now formed a working group on peacekeeping; experts will be discussing questions of nuclear doctrine and weapons, armaments-related cooperation and projects in the realm of civil emergency and science; Russia's Individual Partnership Programme is being updated after a long period of inactivity; and in a few days NATO and Russia will be holding a workshop on retraining retired military personnel in Moscow.
Military-to-military cooperation will be a very important part of our future partnership. In October the new Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev met his NATO counterparts in Maastricht. Two weeks ago, the Russian Chief of Defence Staff, General Kvashnin, visited NATO and SHAPE and, on this occasion, introduced the new Russian Military Representative in Brussels. Enabling the military to get to know each other in practical day-to-day dealings - what better way could there be to build the confidence and trust we so urgently need?
Think of Bosnia, where 1500 Russian soldiers have been patrolling a particularly sensitive part of the Inter Ethnic Boundary Line shoulder to shoulder with their NATO comrades since 1996. On my visits to Bosnia I was struck time and again by the fact that it was hard to distinguish a military briefing by a Russian Colonel from that of his US or Swedish counterpart. I believe it fair to say that this new form of cooperation in the field has opened the eyes of many of our military and politicians, in NATO countries as well as in Russia. It proves that we can work successfully together. A final remark on mutual confidence: Information is the best cure for lingering misconception. The Founding Act contains a provision for a NATO Documentation Centre or Information Office in Moscow. As a first step we hope to see a small Documentation Centre up and running by January of next year. Similarly, I am heartened by the steady stream of Russian visitors -- journalists, military representatives and public officials -- to NATO Headquarters and our Supreme Headquarters in Mons. It took us, at NATO, some time to get used to meeting Russian colleagues in the corridors or queuing in the canteen. These everyday encounters challenge many a cold war stereotype as they give NATO and the Russian military a human face.
Taking a step back I am, of course, ready to concede that my case for a new NATO-Russia realtionship is not without loose ends and a number of significant question marks. I would like to offer some personal reflections on these too.
During the final round of our talks in Moscow on the Founding Act, we stayed at the old Central Committee Hotel President. From my window I could see the new statue of Peter the Great, founder of St.Petersburg, Russia's window to the West. Is he the protagonist of the new Russia? Or will Russia remain, as Churchill once said, a riddle wrapped up in a mystery inside an enigma? Have we made too big a gamble in embracing a Russia which may still show signs of unpredictability? This summer, I found myself in Russia again, this time accompanied by my wife and two grown children. For two weeks we enjoyed the serene beauty of this immense country, its rich cultural heritage, and - most memorable of all - the warmth and hospitality of its people.
But at the back of one's mind, one ca't help asking: will Russia go down the path of cooperation, intensified economic exchange and inclusion that we are encouraging it to take? And will its domestic fabric stand up to the enormous strains that accompany the reorientation of society towards democracy, the market and internationalism? These questions defy an easy answer. The Russian leadership is facing difficulties which are, unfortunately, of nearly the same magnitude as the positive changes - and there have been many in recent years. Russians are experiencing the pains of the end of an era as well as of profound political and economic transformation. But amidst all this, I believe there is a growing realization among the Russian leadership, especially the younger generation, that cooperation with the West - not confrontation - is the best means to achieve security and prosperity. And while the success or failure of these reforms is not in our hands, neither should we remain indifferent. We should encourage this approach by giving its proponents a fair possibility to demonstrate that it can work. Consider the hopeful signs of recent months. The economic free fall has ended and has ushered in incremental growth for the first time in years. Russia's involvement with the outside world in terms of trade and investments is increasing, if slowly. At the same time, Russia has joined nearly every economic club there is: the World Bank, the European Development Bank, a Cooperation treaty with the EU which should enter into force very soon, the Paris and the London Clubs, as well as a liaison agreement with the OECD. Politically, Russia has de facto joined the G-7. All this I take as further evidence of a serious Russian engagement in Europe.
Russia is also engaged in a determined attempt to reform its armed forces. Operating under severe financial constraints, grappling with the problems of huge overstaffing and aging equipment, while attempting to adapt to a changed strategic environment - such is the daunting list of tasks facing the reformers.
Ladies and gentlemen,
One can spend a long time weighing the evidence.
Today, we are extending the area of cooperative security and prosperity further east. In the next century Russia may, for the first time in its history, have a chance to become anchored in Europe in ways which transcend geographic and political boundaries. It is for Russia to decide whether it will walk down this avenue. NATO has shown its readiness to extend a hand of friendship. In this sense, the signing of the Founding Act was indeed a courageous step for both sides to take, a "victory for reason" as Foreign Minister Primakov aptly called it. We cannot force the pace of history. But we should keep an open mind to the potential the present holds.
No. 34 (14/11/97) - 3 Speech by the Secretary General at Ce.Mi.S.S/RAND International Conference on "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative" Rome, November 10, 1997
Prime Minister Prodi,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to address this audience on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. First of all, I would like to congratulate the RAND Corporation - as authors of the study which is being presented here today - and the Centre Militare di Studi Strategici for having convened this conference on Mediterranean security issues, which is co-sponsored by the NATO Office of Information and Press. I also extend my thanks to you, Prime Minister, and your government for your superb hospitality. From the start, Italy has played a significant role in promoting our Mediterranean Initiative. And today's event continues this prominent Italian contribution.
In July of this year, at their Madrid Summit, NATO's heads of State and Government considered that the Mediterranean Dialogue was developing progressively and successfully. They therefore decided to widen the scope and enhance this Dialogue. That is why I think today is the right time to have this meeting on the future of the Mediterranean Initiative. Once again, thank you for giving us this opportunity.
I would like to begin my remarks with a few words to situate Mediterranean security issues in the new political context of post-Cold War Europe. The end of the Cold War brought with it a wider perspective concerning security: The Mediterranean has come into focus as a security region on its own merit for all European institutions.
We have changed how we look at this region and brought it more fully into our analyses of European security. Seeing the Mediterranean region as part of a larger whole gives us better insight into the necessary conditions for stability in territories geographically close to those of the Alliance.
But it is not just the potential for instability that justifies our attention. That would be too narrow and, indeed, too negative. Instead we should consider the importance of the Mediterranean region to the rest of Europe from the viewpoint of trade, investment, maritime transport, natural resources, environmental interdependence, patterns of human migration, and so forth. Taken on this broader socio-economic level, we get a better picture of the growing ties between the Euro-Atlantic area and the Mediterranean basin.
What gives further coherence to this approach are certain facts, starting with the obvious geographic proximity of the southern and eastern Mediterranean littoral to continental Europe. There is also population growth. The North African population, for example, is growing at an approximate rate of 2.5 percent annually, and is expected to increase from 63 million in 1990 to perhaps 142 million by 2025. This large increase of population will put an enormous burden on the cities of the area, where housing, sanitation, employment, and food distribution are already under serious strain.
Consider another aspect - that of human migration. There are about six million immigrants from the Maghreb residing in the European Union, distributed mainly in France, Italy and Spain. Such large inflows are another factor in the equation that ties together the stability of countries on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.
Finally, and as Allies stated in the strategic concept back in 1951, we want to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. Nevertheless, they also expressed their concern for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Indeed, some states along the Mediterranean shores are believed to be acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We must be prudent in our analysis and refrain from the simplistic suggestion that this quest results from the South's challenge of the North, or from a contest between civilisations. It is clear to serious analysts that the rationale for acquiring these weapons is in itself largely caused by regional circumstances.
All these reasons explain why the stability and security of the Mediterranean is so important to Europe.
In addressing the kind of issues I have mentioned, there may be a temptation to look to particular institutions as having the key role to play. This is far too simplistic. We should not forget that the UN, the European Union, NATO, the Western European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have different contributions to make. This equates perfectly well with the wider approach to security - that is, that security today is multi-faceted.
Various initiatives directed towards the Mediterranean region have been launched over the past few years - but with varying objectives, and varying degrees of scope and intensity. In some areas there may be some overlap between individual institutional efforts. But a little bit of overlap is far better than absence or indifference. It is proof that stability and security in this region are linked in a way that does not depend on military factors alone, but must take into account social, economic, environmental aspects. It is also a demonstration that security and stability in the region have to be dealt with by the different organisations in a complementary manner.
Another reason for encouraging a greater involvement and role of all our institutions is the sheer diversity of the region itself. Twenty-two states border the Mediterranean, making it a region of enormous religious, cultural and economic pluralism.
So, a comprehensive strategy for the Mediterranean clearly requires that the responsibility be shared by all institutions in a complementary way.
However, if we had to make generalising statements, we could say that most security challenges in the Mediterranean arise from worsening socio-economic conditions and fragmentation, not from military risks. This makes the European Union the key player in undertaking programmes and outreach that will have a general stabilising effect. Indeed, I recall very well the efforts put into establishing the EU's Barcelona process - which should remain the central multilateral initiative addressing the broader security issues in the area. Indeed, as Secretary General of NATO, I have no problem whatsoever in emphasising this point.
However, this does not mean that NATO shouldn't play an important complementary role.
This brings me to the Alliance's Mediterranean Initiative.
The Mediterranean Initiative is first and foremostly political. It reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is indivisible, and that NATO can play a constructive part in enhancing security and stability more widely in Europe and its neighbouring regions through programmes of outreach, cooperation and partnership. It was with this approach in mind that the Alliance invited six non-NATO Mediterranean countries - Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia - to join us in a Mediterranean Dialogue.
What we are seeking is primarily political. Through the establishment of a dialogue and regular exchanges of information, we can help dispel any misunderstandings or misconceptions that may have arisen over the activities of NATO. We can also get a better understanding of some of the security concerns and perspectives of our Dialogue Partners. The result has been a concerted attempt to meet with representatives from governments and from the informed publics of our Mediterranean Dialogue Partners to explain NATO and its policies and to hear their views.
In this context, I was very pleased last month to have met - for the first time at NATO Headquarters - parliamentarians from the six Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The mere fact that this meeting took place and that there was an open exchange of views on security matters is in itself an important contribution to confidence building. I was struck in particular at this meeting by the strong desire of the parliamentarians to learn more about NATO and to pursue closer cooperation with the West in general. We at NATO will certainly do our part to see that this occurs.
Another aim of our Mediterranean Initiative is a more practical one. Together with our Dialogue Partners, we would like to identify areas where we can, through cooperative activities, build confidence in our relations. In this regard, I cannot but stress strongly that three Dialogue Partners - Egypt, Jordan and Morocco - already cooperate militarily with NATO through their participation in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. Our work together for peace will doubtless have important implications for future cooperation.
In the field of science, Dialogue Partners can participate in meetings conducted under the auspices of the NATO Science Committee. In the field of information, they can participate in NATO-sponsored seminars and conferences. At the NATO School in Oberammergau, several courses have been opened to Dialogue Partners, including courses on peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, arms control and verification, responsibility of military forces in environmental protection, and European security cooperation. The latest addition to our cooperative activities is in the military domain, with the possibility of Partners observing NATO sea and land exercises.
Last July, at the Madrid Summit, the Mediterranean Initiative was given a new dynamism with the creation of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. It will involve Allied member states directly in the political discussions with Partners through a 16+1 format. With this, a forum now exists in which views can be exchanged on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the future development of the Dialogue. This can only be for the mutual benefit of Allies and Partners alike.
What are the next steps in the development of our Mediterranean Initiative?
Before going any further, allow me to point out that two factors will determine to a large extent the future scope and depth of the Mediterranean Dialogue.
First, other processes are extremely pertinent to the enhancement of stability and improved security cooperation in the region. Two come immediately to mind: the Middle East peace process, and the EU's Barcelona process. Both are very different in scope and objectives - but their success or failure will have a considerable effect throughout the region. Therefore it is in the interest of all Allies to ensure that both processes are alive and functioning well if we are to be confident in the success of other bridge-building efforts.
Second, what happens in the socio-economic circumstances of Mediterranean Dialogue Partners and in the region generally will have an impact on their spirit and readiness to cooperate. Here the EU's contribution to the region takes on a particular relevance.
These are areas beyond NATO's capacity to shape or directly influence. But there are steps that we in the Alliance can take to ensure that NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue remains effective, mutually beneficial, and continues to contribute to confidence-building and stability. Future characteristics of the Dialogue could include:
- First, ensuring that all NATO Allies remain actively involved. As I explained earlier, I cannot see how geographic proximity or distance can be the basis for calculating the Allies' security interest in the region. Our collective interest clearly indicates that we should all collectively be involved;
- Second, we must enable the Mediterranean countries to shape this Dialogue according to their specific needs - a Dialogue of variable geometry. And we must provide each Partner with the opportunity to make its specific concerns heard;
- Third, we must enhance the Dialogue on security matters, using the potential of the newly created Mediterranean Cooperation Group;
- Fourth, we could consider developing additional confidence-building measures in the military domain;
- We could also take up the interest of Mediterranean Dialogue Partners in expanding activities in the field of civil emergency planning, particularly regarding civil-military cooperation in response to natural or man-made disasters;
- And finally, we should keep an open mind about the possibility of enlarging the participation in the Dialogue beyond the current six countries.
These are just a few ideas that need to be further elaborated but I think they point in the right direction of an adaptable and differentiated Dialogue according to our Mediterranean partners' specific needs.
Let me now conclude. The end of the Cold War has offered us a new sense of dynamism and new opportunities to exert a positive influence in the Mediterranean region. NATO is today better placed than ever before to contribute to enhanced stability and greater confidence among all countries of the region and those of the Alliance.
NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is developing positively, and, I believe, has considerable potential for further evolution. To exploit this potential to the full requires a continuous influx of fresh ideas. The RAND Corporation, with its long tradition of creative thinking, is an excellent provider of such ideas. I wish the conference much success in its endeavours.
Thank you.