No. 11 (11/04/97)       Preparing for the Madrid Summit

Javier Solana
NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council

This year - 1997 - marks the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. It thus marks half a century of a distinct vision of an Atlantic Community - a vision which set in motion the successful European-North American partnership represented by NATO and made possible the European integration process. This year, very fittingly, will also see a NATO Summit in Madrid in July. The Summit will most obviously bring together the various strands of a NATO adaptation process which began at the onset of this decade. Yet, the Summit will not only define the shape of a new NATO. It will, to a significant extent, set the tone for a new Europe - for the 21st century.

As we move toward our Summit meeting in Madrid next July, NATO's role in bringing about a wider Euro-Atlantic community will be at the very centre of our thinking. That is why I believe that our meeting in July should be seen in a very broad context as a "Summit for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation and Security".

Six key areas

The Summit will not take place 'out of the blue.' The Alliance Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1996 defined the agenda and our objectives in some detail. Work is well in hand to meet the targets they set. I will highlight six Summit issues where I expect to see significant developments:

First, inviting one or more countries to start accession negotiations.

Second, developing an enhanced Partnership for Peace and the initiative for an Atlantic Partnership Council.

Third, reaching agreement with Russia on a strong, stable and enduring security partnership.

Fourth, enhancing relations with Ukraine.

Fifth, moving further ahead on our Mediterranean dialogue.

Finally, we will agree on a reformed command structure optimized for crisis management and with a stronger European role.

Each of these decisions and initiatives reflects, in itself, the fundamentally changed nature of NATO and its purpose. Taken together, they represent a root and branch transformation of the Alliance. So, of NATO's many meetings in its recent history, the Madrid Summit will be perhaps the most crucial and certainly most consequential.

Let me give more detail on each of the areas I have just mentioned.

New members

First, the opening up of NATO to new members. The goal is to welcome new members by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in 1999, after successful completion of accession negotiations and the subsequent ratification by our parliaments.

The prospect of a larger NATO has generated a lively debate in the press. Different views have been expressed in the media, but I am convinced that we are on the right course. From whatever angle one wishes to approach the question, the conclusion is the same. NATO has always been an open organization and it should, and will, accept new members. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made a very strong case for rejoining a Europe from which they were artificially separated in the past. Now they want to join NATO and other institutions; they want to be part of NATO for the same reasons that member countries do not want to leave NATO. They are making great strides to prepare themselves.

The prospect of joining NATO has already exerted a major positive influence on the countries themselves and on the relations between countries. Seeking to earn closer ties with NATO, many partners took early steps to affirm their future democratic orientation. None of this would have happened so speedily without the firm commitment of the allies to open the door to new members. So even before NATO's opening to new members has taken place, it is providing a powerful incentive for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to accelerate their reforms and settle old disputes with their neighbours.

We are at a pivotal point in history. There is a real chance now of creating a security architecture in which everyone's security is improved. Opening NATO to new members is part of that process. We do not therefore consider NATO's opening as the one key issue of the European security debate. It should be seen - and appreciated - for what it is: a natural part of the wider process of European integration, a means of reinforcing the new democracies with a confidence in their destiny and giving them a sense of belonging. I see a strong moral obligation for us to help them fulfil their legitimate aspirations, and many practical benefits.

A new partnership

The process of preparation for an enlarged NATO has been underway - gradually, steadily and openly - since the allies made their commitment to accepting new members in January 1994. By 1999, I have no doubt, we will have a larger NATO. However, to ensure that the opening of NATO increases security and stability for all of Europe, not just those who join the Alliance, we will have to take into account the needs of those who do not join or who may join later. This will require NATO remaining an organization open to new members, as it has always been.

More particularly, increasing security and stability for all of Europe will also require strengthening the Partnership for Peace, which will, after the Summit as before, continue to engage allies and partners alike in a common endeavour. Accordingly, since September 1996, a Senior Level Group (SLG) has been developing ideas for an advanced form of partnership.  It reflects the fact that the relationship between allies and partners has developed and intensified since the inception of Partnership for Peace in 1994.

The possibilities for a partnership have grown, and it is no longer a question of the one-way traffic of ideas and expertise. The progress the SLG has made so far is very promising. NATO is now planning to involve partners systematically in as much of our work as possible, and particularly in planning for the whole range of contingency operations.  By the same token, the initiative to create an Atlantic Partnership Council to act as a single, coordinating mechanism for NATO's cooperation activities would permit close consultations between allies and partners on the direction and content of the partnership. We can therefore expect to see a wholesale upgrading of our relations both in terms of the range of military activity, and the depth of political consultations.

Russia

Neither the opening of NATO, nor an enhanced partnership are ends in themselves. They are a means to an end - that is, increased stability and security for all of Europe, including Russia. Indeed, a European security architecture worthy of its name must be one that includes Russia, making its full contribution.

The accession of new members to NATO will in no sense pose a threat to Russia - quite the contrary, as a stable Central and Eastern Europe, sure of its own identity and security, is to everyone's benefit. Nevertheless, Russian perceptions do matter and they must be taken seriously. Continuing Russian anxieties about NATO are based on a profound misunderstanding of character and intentions of the organization. Misplaced fears and stereotypes of the past still prevail. The result is a paradox. Russia expresses her misgivings about the opening of NATO by keeping a distance to closer cooperation. Yet this distance is precisely what prevents her from understanding why an open Alliance is not directed against Russia.

I believe we can get beyond this circular logic, and the key is to establish a relationship between NATO and Russia which reflects Russia's status as an important contributor in her own right to European security. In January and again in February, I met with Foreign Minister Primakov in the first phase of a series of meetings whose purpose is to reach agreement on a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Russia. Our discussions can be qualified as positive, business-like and constructive. An agenda has been set for further meetings. Both NATO and Russia have a common interest in seeing this process through to a positive result. Our close and successful cooperation in Bosnia is a model on which to build. And, as in Bosnia, our ability to cooperate will carry a hopeful message for the whole of Europe.

Ukraine

An independent, stable and democratic Ukraine is of strategic importance for the development of Europe as a whole. Ukraine's development of a strong, enduring relationship with NATO is therefore an important aspect of the emerging security architecture. Ukraine participates in Partnership for Peace and there will be a military exercise near Lviv next year. It has also participated in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. Ukraine has made proposals for extending our cooperation beyond Partnership for Peace. In the coming months, we shall work out together a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine relationship which could be formalized, possibly by the time of the Summit. An enhanced relationship between NATO and Ukraine will contribute to Ukraine's integration into the European structures.

Mediterranean dialogue

The Summit will also take NATO's dialogue with Mediterranean countries another step forward. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean, and the Mediterranean dimension is one of the various security components of the European security architecture.

Consequently, NATO has already started a dialogue with six countries of the region - Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. They have all said they find it useful and want to go further. The purpose of the dialogue is to build confidence and to lay the ground for future cooperation. We need also to dispel some of the misperceptions and apprehensions that exist, on both sides of the Mediterranean. We want to create good, strong and friendly relations across the Mediterranean just as we have done across Europe.

Our dialogue is intended to complement other international efforts, such as ones carried out by the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Western European Union (WEU). I am sure that in the months ahead we will succeed in moving towards the next stage of a process which is already bearing fruit.

Military structure

One of the most complex tasks for the Summit will be to put the finishing touches on NATO's new military structure. Much has already been agreed. For instance, the new command structure will be smaller and will contain two important innovations. The first is the introduction of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept. This will provide the Alliance for the first time with an expressly organized capability to deploy a peacekeeping force into a crisis area. Most significantly, this is not conceived as a NATO-only capability. From the outset, CJTFs are designed to operate with the participation of non-NATO countries.

The second innovation in the new structure is the growing role and responsibility of the Europeans within it. This commitment has contributed to persuading Spain to join the new integrated military structure. The adaptation of NATO has also made France consider participating actively in NATO's military structures.

At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin last June, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed on the development of identifiable arrangements which could be used by the European members for WEU-led operations. The preparatory work is ongoing, there is a wide consensus on how to proceed, and the Summit will put the European Security and Defence Identity on a firm basis within NATO. Most notably, there will be a Deputy SACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) with specific responsibilities for developing and preparing for WEU-led operations, when it is decided to support a European-led operation using NATO assets.

NATO's internal adaptation should not be misunderstood. NATO's effectiveness will be enhanced, not reduced because of the increased flexibility and new options it will give us. There will be no erosion of NATO's military efficiency or undermining the key importance of the transatlantic link.

Conclusion

The issues for the July Summit are neither random nor disconnected. There is a coherence and a vision behind them. This new NATO is not just about providing collective defence to its members. It will be at the heart of building a better and safer Europe across the board.

Though changed in outlook and structure, NATO will retain and intensify those unique characteristics, particularly the capacity to act in a crisis, which are the hallmarks of our decades of success. In Bosnia and Herzegovina NATO has already made the key difference by bringing to an end years of conflict and creating the stability which makes real peace possible. We were able to do so because of our ability to plan, organize and deploy multinational forces with the manifest capacity to do the job and a credibility which commands respect. SFOR is smaller than IFOR, which it has replaced, and its mission is more limited. Yet, like IFOR, SFOR is backed by the same political direction, support, unity of command, and robust rules of engagement. In other words, NATO's unmatched experience and expertise will continue to be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina through SFOR; and we will continue to give the same priority and attention to the problems of Bosnia, irrespective of Summit preparations.

IFOR and SFOR, as coalitions for peace, have a significance that goes far beyond the Balkans. They are evidence of an undivided Europe at work; a real sign that in the new Europe, the new NATO will play a full part in ensuring the conditions of a secure and stable Europe.