The transatlantic debate over Iraq has revealed a number of truths about US and European approaches to international relations. The fact that the United States is more, and European nations relatively less, willing to use force to deal with international security issues was observed by some in the 1980s. This fact has been rediscovered and even exaggerated by contemporary neo-conservative pundits.

The profound transatlantic differences over use of force against Iraq have exposed Bush administration cynicism that many Bush officials brought with them into their government jobs. Recent events undoubtedly have reinforced their view of Europeans as feckless friends, some of whom they no longer even regard as friends and allies. Many Members of Congress appear to be competing with popular comedians and commentators to see who can better bash European allies that disagree with US policy.

Before Iraq, there was a persistent but minority residue of anti-Americanism around Europe, ready to be energized by the right circumstances. The Bush administration with its unilateral behavior, "with us or against us" attitudes, and fundamentalist, unshakable beliefs in clear distinctions between right and wrong in the world has swollen the ranks of those in Europe who mistrust current US policy directions and question US motivations and values. Taken together, the excesses of the recent debate on top of the real policy issues have driven transatlantic relations to new lows.

The bottom line is that the United States and Europe still need each other. Our economies are so deeply intermingled that if less responsible members of Congress had their way and imposed bans on European products, American firms would suffer collateral damage. Moreover, the international community needs this "crucial couple" to find some form of marital harmony. Working together, the United States and Europe have the wits and resources to deal with most international problems. In the absence of such cooperation - as recently demonstrated over Iraq - the international community simply doesn't function very well.

So how do we get out of the hole we have mutually dug for ourselves? The United States, for its part, faces the challenge of using its power in ways that reflect U.S. values and draw on the American public's desire to cooperate with other countries while not inspiring opposition by being too domineering. In other words, the United States has to learn how to be a hegemon without acting like one. (This is not the first time this advice has appeared on these pages, but it remains necessary advice nonetheless!!)

If U.S. allies still believe that U.S. leadership is essential on many international issues, as they apparently do, then their challenge is to express their criticism of U.S. leadership style in terms that are appropriate for frank and honest discussions among friends, and in ways that will promote US-European cooperation, not make it more difficult. The sense of "community" among the transatlantic nations has been the first victim of the crisis over Iraq. On the "day after Iraq," the United States and Europe will need to breathe new life into the sense of common destiny among the Atlantic community of nations. For those who share this belief, the time has come to start preparing a re-awakening of transatlantic good will and cooperation.

No matter how the Iraq issue is resolved, we should now begin preparation of a new Atlantic Community Treaty, reaffirming the broad area of U.S-European shared values and interests. The treaty would have both political and functional goals. Politically, such a major political act would shift the focus of US-European relations toward all that we have in common and away from the exclusive focus on what divides us. Functionally, the treaty among all members of NATO and the European Union would create a soft-power framework of cooperation to complement the hard power frameworks of NATO and the EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy.

This will not be easy; attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic today make it even more difficult. However, without a renewed sense of common destiny, the United States would be weaker and less predictable and Europe would be less confident and much less secure.