"NATO and the Atlantic Community after the Prague"
Summit and the Munich Security Conference¹: Time for a new Transatlantic Bargain? Summarised by Wolfgang Bücherl, (C·A·P - Center for Applied Policy Research University of Munich)
Munich, 12 February 2003

Speaking before an audience of around 25 scholars, policy-makers, journalists and businessmen at the Center for Applied Policy Research, Professor Sloan noted that transatlantic relations are presently in a "very dangerous moment ," and that "lots of mistakes" have been made on both sides, which has resulted in both sides thinking of and speaking to another "in caricatures". He reminded the audience that the U.S. and Europe have been heading in the direction of conflict for a while. This is mainly due to the American tendency to unilateralism and the European tendency to what Sloan called "empty autonomy."

While affirming that there are a number of structural factors underlying the current American behavior towards Europe, Sloan defended the view that the special circumstances and the personalities of many members of the Bush administration have a great influence. Beyond this, the U.S. and Europe "still have more in common with each other than they have with any other country or group of countries in the world." In order to improve the strained relationship, Sloan recommended that both sides take steps toward one another. For the U.S., this would mean being more careful with its actions, "to be a hegemon without acting like one ." Europe, on the other hand, would need to develop the necessary mentality and capacities to "put some hard power behind its words," while changing its attitude of "empty autonomy."

In addition, he pointed out the need to start thinking about long-term means of repairing the serious damage done to NATO, the EU and the entire transatlantic community, during the current Iraq crisis. To that end, Professor Sloan reaffirmed his idea of elaborating a new "Transatlantic Community Treaty," which could serve to reaffirm the sense of common destiny and shared values. This would aid in once again putting the focus back on the positive side of transatlantic relations and in developping and improving soft power cooperation in a number of sectors, including the environment, economic issues, etc.

Professor Puhl affirmed that the Iraq crisis represents a watershed in transatlantic relations for which no one was prepared. It has further lead to a non-understanding and hard feelings on both sides. Differences have always existed in the past, but they were covered up by a common strategic interest that seems to be lacking at the moment. While the U.S. and Europe continue to share common values, they currently do not have a common agenda. In Puhl's view, the primary task for the future is to find a "new bargain" and, most importantly, to decide what the actors want the EU and NATO to be. According to Puhl, the best option would be a strong and united Europe allied to North America, with NATO as a forum for security policy cooperation. The problem, however, lies in the fact that Europe seems anything but united at the moment.

Puhl had a number of recommendations in order to improve the transatlantic relationship:

1) to recognize the importance of lasting alliances, as opposed to ad-hoc "coalitions of the willing";

2) to have respect and listen instead of clinging to stereotypes; and

3) to learn about cultural differences, to accept them and be aware of them in negotiations. He therefore sees an urgent need for a new thinking, and not for new treaties. In conclusion, Puhl said leaders on both sides of the Atlantic need to be aware that the relations are a two-way-street.

In the ensuing discussion, much emphasis was put on the Iraq crisis. It was noted that this crisis shows how important foreign policy coordination is for the European countries, in order to remain influential. In this context, the crisis was deemed to have all the ingredients of a "catastrophe." Professor Puhl stated that Europe is in the middle of dramatic change that it was not prepared for, that there is "no long-term strategy visible." It was added that in order to change the tone and substance in transatlantic relations, European governments will have to find an answer to the "American question": "How relevant is the U.S. for European foreign policy?" With reference to the current crisis, one possible answer may be that the U.S. is and will remain a constituent factor in European foreign policy - for the good or for the bad. A reinforced European identity would thus require an awareness of this implicit influence.

As for the American side, Professor Sloan expressed his hope for a learning curve within the Bush administration; as of now, only Colin Powell seems to be concerned about the perception of U.S. foreign policy abroad. Burden sharing was another aspect discussed at large. Many participants stressed the importance of the European contribution in fields of soft power, such as development aid. Regarding the future relevance of NATO, it was noted that the coming enlargement will almost certainly "re-Americanize" the alliance and, might, consequently, lead the U.S. to strengthen its efforts in keeping NATO relevant. Whether NATO retains its current form or will serve primarily as a forum for security cooperation, remains to be seen.

The recent stalemate in the North Atlantic Council in the question of dealing with the US bid to support Turkey, that was settled Sunday night, went to the heart of the alliance. The question of allied solidarity is the core of the Alliance, but is this really what was on the table? Was it imaginable that France, Belgium or Germany would turn their backs on Turkey in the case of an external attack? The real dispute between France, Belgium and Germany, on the one hand, and the US, Britain, Turkey and some more, on the other, concerned NATO's future direction, Europe's role for the US and the ability of the Europeans to speak with one voice. The NATO summit in Prague in December 2002 had been a powerful demonstration of the United States' resolve to set the Alliance on its course. The Bush administration set the agenda and made it quite clear that - in line with its philosophy that there is no neutral ground - the allies had to decide whether NATO would adjust to suit America's battle against new threats - or become irrelevant. The outcome was quite impressive in these terms: Seven countries, that are known to give unconditional political support to the United States, were invited to become new members. The Alliance tacitly abandonned the traditional territorial limitation to its geographical outreach (the 'Euro-Atlanic Sphere' had always been a controversial term) and European members committed themselves to building up capabilities that would supplement American military means for global power projection.

In Prague, it was not hard to see France's consternation, whose concept of NATO has always been somewhat contradictionary to that of the United States. Since the early nineties, France had been resistant, and later hesitant, to agree to a NATO expansion. France never really embraced the concept of NATO going out of area, especially out of the 'Euro-Atlantic Sphere'. And France never wanted to give NATO a global role, as long there was the possibility of such a NATO becoming a tool of Washington. It is unnecessary to add that such a NATO would hinder France's intentions for the EU to promote the defense policy aims of Paris.

Thus, the "NON" in Brussels, in concert with Belgium and also Germany, was an attempt to water down the results of Prague: Iraq should not set a precedent for future scenarios where the US would ask NATO to deal with the consequeces of its own security policy. In this regard, the dispute in the NATO-Council also touched upon the question of Europe's role for the US. Since the end of the East-West-Conflict, Europe has watched its stakes fall in Washington. There is no longer a need for the Europeans to refuse American claims for a seat at their table, as there was with Kissinger's challenge in the early days of European Political Cooperation in the early 1970s. The Americans themselves came to the conclusion that Europe was no longer the top-priority on their agenda. Consequently, it took the Europeans quite some time to convince the US - and also themselves - that the Balkan crises could not be resolved without American diplomatic and military engagement. Today, Europe could again become relevant for the US. That is if it plays a supportive role in America's struggle against terrorism, tyrants and lethal technology, i.e. Weapons of Mass Destruction. So far, the Europeans have come to differing conclusions about the degree in which they would like to play that role - if at all.

Finally, NATO internal dispute sheded light on the ability of Europe to play a role as a unified foreign policy actor. The dividing line in transatlantic relations is not only the Atlantic, its is the British Channel, the Oder-Neisse-Line, the Alps, the Pyrennies and so on. Europe as a whole and the EU, in particular, host a number of different national strategic visions and foreign policy priorities that do not seem to be reconciliable at this point of time. One reason for this impasse may be the lack of a common strategic culture. The other, probably more imminent, reason is the weakness of institutions and procedures that help, and if necessary, oblige the national governments to find common ground. The fact that the presidency of the European Union recently learned of a common declaration of solidarity with the US from a number of present and future EU members, by taking a look in the paper, tells a long story. The recent dispute has not ruptured NATO. The alliance has been through many internal struggles - Suez, De Gaulle's Challenge, SDI - simply to dismantle itself foolishly. But after the dust settles in Brussels, one may remember this dispute as a critical landmark for the course of the EU's Foreign Policy, the North Atlantic Alliance and transatlantic cooperation at large.

¹ Transatlantic Seminar with Dr. Stanley Sloan, Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative and President of VIC-Vermont, and Professor Detlef Puhl, Deputy Dean at the College of International and Security Studies, George C. Marshall Center.