No.2. (14/02/03)
Nato at war
(An inexcusable attempt to deny Turkey protection)
February 10, 2003
Nato, it was quipped, was founded to keep "the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down". It appears from some of the positions taken this weekend that it exists today to freeze the Americans out, keep the Turks down and leave President Saddam Hussein satisfied. The threat issued by Belgium, backed by France and Germany, to block the relocation of Nato assets in support of Turkey is extraordinary and "inexcusable", as Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, and Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, both contended. If confirmed this morning then it will do significant and lasting damage not only to transatlantic ties but political relations within Europe. The three governments concerned must reconsider their stance, even at the last hour.
The measures that have been proposed are modest. They involve the transfer of Patriot air defence missiles, Nato early-warning planes and anti-chemical and biological warfare units to Turkey. This is a matter of contingency planning in the event of any military clash in the Iraqi theatre. It does not constitute a Nato endorsement of possible US-led action. It is a recognition, which should be obvious, that war is a possibility and were it to take place then Turkey would be entitled to collective protection.
This should not be a controversial issue. It has instead been seized upon in certain quarters for purely political purposes. It has been claimed that shifting this equipment to Iraq would be to pander to American "unilateralism" and undermine diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful settlement to this crisis. In truth, however, Brussels, Paris and Berlin are engaged in pyrrhic posturing. If Nato as a whole does not assist Turkey then its major components, notably the United States and Britain, will certainly do so. The dispute would force Washington to act, against its own wishes, in a "unilateral" fashion and undermine the shared authority of Nato.
The notion that providing Ankara with defensive material would undercut diplomatic activity is ludicrous. The only reason that Iraq ever agreed to readmit UN weapons inspectors after a four-year break and is showing the slightest interest in the demands of Hans Blix and Mohamed Elbaradei is because the US Army is breathing down Saddam's neck. Whenever Baghdad senses that a military onslaught against it is a realistic option, it at least contemplates making concessions. The perception that Nato is in disarray eases the pressure on the Iraqi leadership. This impasse will not encourage Saddam to open up his arsenal.
The same might be said about the rather ambiguous Franco-German "plan" for more "intrusive" inspections. As General Powell pointed out in his response, this initiative addresses the "wrong issue" and could only serve as a "diversion". The onus should not be on the UN to provide itself with a larger magnifying glass but on Iraq to produce an absolutely accurate account of its weapons of mass destruction and then assist in their elimination. This will not occur if Saddam believes that Resolution 1441 is far from his "final chance" to avoid war but the basis for another round of negotiations. This belated blueprint for peace will render international unity, not a military conflict, less probable.
As Mr Rumsfeld said in his interview conducted with The Times and a number of other leading European newspapers, Nato will doubtless "survive" an internal dispute over Turkey. But as he also asserted, any clash on this question would be "such a surprising and breathtaking event that I suspect it would reverberate for a while". It is not often that the feisty Defence Secretary can be accused of understatement. In this instance, presumably to induce the rebels to retreat, he has been uncharacteristically diplomatic. Nato might indeed just about "survive" this affair - but it will hardly prosper from it.
(The Times)