Russia and NATO: An Evolutionary Development
December 4, 2001

NATO and Russia have in recent weeks moved toward a new, more cooperative relationship. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson have proposed creation of a new NATO-Russia body in which decisions would actually be taken. Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently is considering these suggestions favorably. Such a step would represent a major change in Russia's relationship with NATO, but must be seen in perspective to understand its limits as well as its potential.

The military and ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union, with Russia at its core, along with European concerns about a resurgent Germany, provided the original stimulus for the 1949 transatlantic bargain. These two factors also provided motivation for the steps taken in the 1940s and 1950s to initiate the process of European unification. Decades of liberal German democracy, loyalty to the Western alliance, and the process of European integration dissipated the German "threat." When the Soviet Union imploded at the end of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies discovered that even though this founding threat was also disappearing, the cooperation that had developed over the years was not only based on solid common values and interests, but also had continuing utility in a post-Soviet world.

Nevertheless, Russia remained a major factor in allied calculations. In spite of Russia's devastated economy and military forces that were incapable of putting down rebellion in the former Soviet Republic of Chechnya, Russia remained a world-class nuclear power and a huge variable in Europe's future. The development of a liberal democratic system in Russia would constitute a dramatic gain for international peace and stability. An autocratic, deprived and dissatisfied Russia would constitute a major source of instability for the indefinite future. As a consequence, the transatlantic allies moved carefully throughout the 1990s trying to assess how steps that they were taking to adapt their alliance would affect and be affected by Russia.

As the EU and NATO began their separate processes of outreach to the new democracies emerging in Eastern and Central Europe and figuring how to respond to their long-repressed desires for membership in Western institutions, neither NATO nor the EU thought that Russia would qualify for membership in either organization for as far out as the eye could see. It was clear, however, that Russia, even as weak as it was, remained a major player in European security.

NATO in particular reached out to Russia as it moved toward including the Soviet Union's former Central and East European "allies" in the Western security system. Russia was offered participation in NATO's partnership program and then, in the context of the first round of NATO enlargement, was given a special relationship to the alliance with negotiation of "The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia Federation," establishing a "Permanent Joint Council" - NATO nations plus Russia - as a framework for continuing consultations.

Russia's acceptance of the PJC was always grudging. Russian leaders wanted something more - something that would appropriately acknowledge Russia's importance in European security. The NATO countries, on the other hand, did not want to give Russia a direct say in NATO deliberations and certainly not a veto over NATO actions - a concern directly expressed during the US debate on the first round of NATO enlargement.

However, under President Putin, an autocratic leader with pragmatic foreign policy inclinations, Russia and NATO have moved toward a more meaningful relationship. The most important stimulus was provided by the September 11 terrorist attacks and Putin's offer of assistance in the US-declared war against terrorism. Putin's position clearly helped strengthen his relationship with President Bush, and facilitated work toward agreements on dramatic cuts in strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and possible agreements on missile defenses. Putin also hinted at new Russian perspectives on its relationship to NATO and Russia's attitude toward NATO enlargement.

Once again, Tony Blair, who had played such an important role in getting the European Union's Common European Security and Defense Policy on the tracks, started the ball rolling for a new Russia-NATO initiative by proposing creation of a new forum for Russia-NATO cooperation. Prime Minister Blair, in a letter to NATO Secretary General George Robertson, suggested creation of a "Russia/North Atlantic Council" which would take decisions by consensus on certain issues affecting both NATO and Russia, for example, terrorism, arms proliferation and peacekeeping. According to press reports, Blair hoped that post 9/11 events could lead to a new world order, ending old enmities and building new bridges.

Apparently with the blessing of the Bush administration, Secretary General Robertson put the idea forward during an official visit to Moscow. Headlines blared that "Russia Could Get Veto Power in New NATO." Russian conservatives worried that Putin was about to give away the store. American conservatives were concerned that the move might do in NATO. Polish observers fretted that this might be the first step toward Russian membership in NATO. French commentators wondered if events were moving too fast for rational consideration of their consequences.

In reality, it seems likely that the road will lead to an evolutionary, appropriate development in the Russia-NATO relationship. The Permanent Joint Council will likely be replaced by a new "Russia-North Atlantic Council." The new council will meet more regularly, and will actually make decisions on some subjects. However, the regular agenda of the North Atlantic Council will not be shifted to the new framework. The NAC will decide when issues should be submitted to decision by the R-NAC (as NATO acronym-makers seem likely to dub the new council) and when they should be kept within usual NATO decisionmaking channels. If the R-NAC becomes deadlocked on an issue because of Russian disagreement, this would not bloc the NATO members from acting in the NAC without Russian agreement or participation. Russia will not have a "veto" over NATO decisions, only over joint Russia-NATO decisions, which is not unreasonable.

The advent of a more meaningful, action-oriented NATO-Russia relationship could be a very positive development for European security. It will not block NATO decisions on enlargement of the alliance. In fact, just as creation of the Permanent Joint Council with Russia "accompanied" the first round of NATO enlargement, establishment of the new Russia-North Atlantic Council will likely parallel NATO's decisions on the next round of NATO enlargement, which now could begin a stream of membership negotiations, initially with Slovenia and Slovakia and then the three Baltic states, with Romania and Bulgaria not far behind.

Creating a new Russia-NATO forum will not presage imminent Russian membership in the alliance. Russia is a long way from meeting the guidelines for membership laid out in NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement. Russia falls far short particularly in terms of the internal development of liberal democratic institutions, including a free press, and a Western-style human rights regime. If Russia some day meets these guidelines, there truly will be a "new world order" and Russia should then be considered a legitimate candidate for membership. Until then, there should remain a clear distinction between what issues are decided with members of the alliance and which are decided with this very important Russian partner.