A Perspective on the Future of the Transatlantic Bargain by Stanley R. Sloan
Ottawa, 7 October 2001

Thank you Mr. Chairman. For over 20 years now I have worked with the Assembly, in a variety of capacities, to promote the objectives of the transatlantic alliance through dialogue and cooperation among members of the alliance, potential members, and partner states. It is an honor and my pleasure to return to a session of the Assembly to discuss the current status of and future prospects for the Atlantic Community, particularly in the wake of the most horrific and devastating terrorist attacks on the United States last month.

At the end of the Cold War the future of the transatlantic alliance came under close scrutiny. Perhaps you will recall, as do I, that some observers suggested in 1990 that it might be useful to keep the Warsaw Pact around as a "partner" for NATO in a future European security system. Others suggested that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could take over leading responsibilities for security in Europe. Even among strong supporters of NATO there was great skepticism about adapting alliance missions and capabilities to post-Cold War security conditions. In the US debate on NATO enlargement, doubts persisted about the extent to which NATO cooperation should be tailored to fit new "non-Article 5" threats.

Today, some still question whether the United States should maintain peacekeeping troops in the Balkans. But NATO's involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo and now Macedonia have demonstrated not just the utility, but the necessity, of sustaining political and military cooperation between North America and Europe. The US role in these operations has been and remains critical to their success. Today, few would question how important it will be to ensure that the members of the Atlantic Community stay united and strong against the insidious threat of terrorism which struck at America's heart on September 11, and which will strike again if given the opportunity to do so.

NATO has responded well to the initial challenge, declaring the September 11 attacks to be cause for invoking Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington for the first time ever. The display of allied unity, compassion and support have been impressive. As a result, there is an even more solid foundation on which the future of the transatlantic alliance can be built. We do not, however, have a guarantee of success, just as we have never had a guarantee of security. Success in keeping the Atlantic Community strong and ensuring security of the transatlantic nations will require hard work and sacrifice, cooperation and compromise. This formula is not new. It after all is the formula that has kept the alliance vital throughout the Cold War and in the years since.

Today, I propose in my brief presentation to consider some of the factors and issues that are likely to challenge the ability of the allies to keep their alliance strong. They include short and longer term responses to international terrorism, future policy on missile defense, enlargement of NATO, the implications of a Common European Security and Defense Policy, and the related friction between US unilateralist tendencies and European autonomy instincts.

First, it is obvious that the allies must conduct a "war" against terrorism in ways that deal effectively with terrorist threats while not undermining fundamental democratic liberties or the potential for future cooperation among alliance members. We all remember the debates in the 1990s, particularly those leading up to NATO's 1999 strategic concept, in which the United States imagined a NATO mandate without artificial limitations while many European countries wanted to prevent the appearance of an "open-ended" role for the alliance in dealing with future security challenges.

In 1998, Senator Roth's report on "NATO in the 21^st Century," for which I had the privilege of serving as rapporteur, said that NATO should address terrorist challenges: "Even when individual terrorist acts affect only one Ally, it should be clear that each such act is part of a broader terrorist phenomenon that threatens the entire Alliance. Effective burdensharing in the future will require that all Allies contribute in a demonstrable fashion to the goal of combating terrorism. NATO should be used more actively as a forum for sharing of intelligence, consultations on counter-terrorist approaches and strategies, and joint actions against terrorist threats."

Recent events have demonstrated that the United States was right concerning the nature of future threats to transatlantic security - most of them have roots outside Europe and must be dealt with well beyond NATO's borders. However, the differing perspectives among NATO members concerning the best instruments to employ against disparate threats have not disappeared, and will, on occasion, make consensus and cooperation difficult to find. The passage of time and other developments will inevitably put some distance between us and the coalescing shock of the September 11 atrocities. The challenge will be to keep the alliance on track in spite of the inevitable disagreements on military tactics and political strategies.

The war on terrorism may be long and difficult. But it seems clear the United States will want to ensure that the response to the terrorist attacks strengthens America's most important alliance instead of undermining it. As a start, the administration must produce the best evidence and intelligence it can about the sources of support for the terrorist attacks. This part of the process already offers the allies an opportunity to contribute. No country, particularly the United States, will want to reveal sensitive sources and methods by which individual pieces of intelligence are obtained. These considerations obviously placed some limitations on the initial US briefing to the allies on this issue on 26 September. However, in this case, all coalition countries will have to be as open as possible about the information they develop and exchange with the others. The United States needs to set the example to encourage other countries to make their best efforts both in collection and sharing of intelligence information about the terrorists.

Beyond the intelligence aspect, the United States should be careful to ask allies to do things that they are capable of doing. It probably would not be wise to make military attacks against the terrorists a NATO-commanded operation. It might be best to use an ad hoc coalition, hopefully including key NATO countries, to mount the actual operations. However, support for the military action should be backed by a formal NATO operation. The United States should ask that a special NATO task force be created to help organize and support future counter-terrorist military operations.

The NATO allies must avoid at all cost the perception that they do not support the United States in responding to the terrorist threat. As detailed plans for military operations develop, support for the United States will entail costs for the NATO countries, including possible domestic opposition, increased vulnerability to terrorist strikes, and combat casualties of their own. The allies, if appropriately involved in the decisionmaking process, must be willing to pay the price. Failure to do so could mean the effective end of the transatlantic alliance in a fashion that would undermine both US and European security for decades to come.

Beyond this immediate and continuing challenge, other issues, prominent before September 11, will not go away, and may even become more complicated. One of the most difficult is the question of missile defense. The issue certainly has fallen off the front pages in recent weeks, but it surely has not disappeared. On the one hand, it could be argued that the war on terrorism and the potential economic recession will put a brake on the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans. These factors will certainly pose some problems for the administration. It could also be argued that the terrorist attacks will make it more difficult for Americans to imagine the possibility of being invulnerable to foreign threats, thereby undermining political support for missile defenses.

Could it also happen that Moscow's support for the war on terrorism will make it more difficult for the United States to abandon the ABM Treaty? Will there be a tacit or explicit price exacted in this area for Russian cooperation, which could be critical to the campaign in the short and long run? On the other hand, the attacks may have the effect of solidifying support for all programs designed to fortify US homeland defenses from potential threats. The disappearing budget surplus might slow progress on missile defense programs but not undermine fundamental beliefs in their rationale. In this case, the United States and its allies must still work to find common policies that take into account security interests and perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic.

A question I would pose to European members of the Assembly is how recent events are likely to affect European attitudes toward missile defenses: will such defenses appear more important in the light of the attack, or will they still be regarded as part of America's unrealistic search for invulnerability?

The Assembly has for the past decade been a leader on the issue of NATO enlargement. Yesterday's presentation by Jeffrey Simon helped illustrate the continuing complexity of this issue, which the Bush Administration and the NATO allies must address in the coming months. In my opinion, it would be a failure of will and commitment for the allies not to initiate a new stage of the enlargement process next year. In 1998, "NATO in the 21^st Century" suggested that the enlargement should be "paced, not paused." Unfortunately, the process has, for all intents and purposes, been on hold every since.

On the other hand, it is not clear what the next stage should be. Your rapporteur has recommended that all nine current candidates be "invited" to begin the accession process, turning the process of "waves" into a continuous "stream." This idea certainly has its strong points, affirming the process but allowing the allies to monitor and control the flow according to candidate performance and international conditions. Other conceivable options include inviting just Slovenia and Slovakia or inviting these two plus one, or all three, Baltic states. The Baltic issue was sufficiently difficult before September 11, but now perhaps becomes more so. Just as Russia may expect some consideration on the ABM treaty issue in return for its cooperation in the war against terrorism, Moscow may expect forbearance on NATO enlargement as well. President Putin's statements during his recent meetings in Germany and Belgium suggest that he is looking at the current circumstances not only as justifying Russia's struggle in Chechnya but also as warranting more attention to Russian interests among "Western" powers. Following Putin's meetings with EU officials and Secretary General Robertson, Putin even suggested the possibility that Russia would reconsider its opposition to NATO enlargement if NATO is becoming a more "political" organization.

Will it be reasonable for NATO to put aside the aspirations of the Baltic states, at least temporarily, as part of the payment for Moscow's help in the war against terror? The struggle against terrorism certainly appears to offer a clear opportunity for further rapprochement between NATO and Russia, and that opportunity should not be missed. Perhaps your rapporteur's approach is a good compromise, with Slovenia and Slovakia at the head of the queue and the Baltic states not far behind, with a clear message to Moscow that NATO will work through all the practical issues associated with the membership of the Baltic states in NATO but will not defer their membership indefinitely.

The developing relationship between NATO and the European Union's Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) has already seen its ups and downs. When, in the early 1980s, I wrote a book entitled NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain, I argued that only if Europeans felt their defense efforts had home-grown roots and rationales would the European allies take on an equitable part of the transatlantic defense burden. The world has changed much since then, but the members of the EU have now made the political commitment to create the potential for EU military intervention in cases where NATO decides not to mount its own operation.

How does this affect NATO? Most Americans think of NATO as embodying the heart and soul of the transatlantic relationship. The political link is particularly important to Members of Congress, many of whom support US involvement in NATO even if they are otherwise skeptical about US participation in multilateral institutions. Therefore, one critical political touchstone for many Americans is whether or not European actions strengthen or weaken NATO. Another critical issue is whether or not European actions relieve the United States of defense or financial burdens. The burdensharing perspective is a natural one in an alliance of democratic states, the leaders of which are all attempting to buy the best security for their electorates at the least cost. The issue will not go away, particularly at a time when the United States is seeking international assistance in its war against terrorism. From an American perspective, many questions about CESDP remain unanswered. They include:

In addition, the Bush administration, may be particularly concerned that CESDP will increase transatlantic trade and industrial tensions by supporting development of a "fortress Europe" mentality in defense procurement. This, of course, is an area where the United States could take much of the blame for the lack historically of a "two-way street" in transatlantic armaments trade.

Future US policy towards CESDP will in any circumstances remain conflicted. A "yes, but" characterization of the US attitude will likely remain appropriate. Bush administration and congressional concerns about negative consequences of CESDP are likely to increase in direct proportion to the emphasis EU governments put on "autonomy" when describing what they hope to accomplish in CESDP. The word itself, although objectively neutral, is seen on the American site of the Atlantic as a challenge to US leadership. A politically-united Europe is not likely to emerge for many years - perhaps not for many decades. It is difficult to imagine the EU nations making commitments in the defense area that are more far-reaching than those they have made to political union at any given point in time. It seems very unlikely, in other words, that defense union can proceed ahead of political union, but rather must develop in parallel or lag somewhat behind the process of developing greater political cohesion among the member states. Unless and until the members of the European Union have achieved something approaching political union, a Common European Security and Defense Policy will remain an intergovernmental exercise, subject to variable perceptions of national interests among current and potential EU members.

Nevertheless, the foundation has been laid for a fundamental change in the transatlantic bargain. If all goes well, the change could carry the alliance back toward the original 1949 bargain, which anticipated an equitable sharing of burdens and responsibilities between the United States and Europe. A successful transition, however, will require a high level of statesmanship, hard work and more than a little luck.

At the beginning of the new millennium, decisionmakers on both sides of the Atlantic must answer a basic question: is the transatlantic community and its core institution, NATO, now of diminishing relevance? The Euro-Atlantic statesmen and warriors who helped keep the sense of community alive during the Cold War are an aging, indeed disappearing, breed. Successor generation leaders have so far seen fit to preserve a continued sense of community across the Atlantic, but future leaders may set different priorities.

In Europe, as most creative political energy has begun flowing toward construction of CESDP, NATO is increasingly taken for granted - still honored in rhetoric, less so when it comes to resources and political energy. In the United States, enthusiasm for a National Missile Defense and concentration on the war against terrorism could create deep splits in the Euro-Atlantic community if not handled properly.

The most fundamental challenge to the Atlantic Community is to overcome natural tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic that could tear the alliance apart. The combination of European concentration on creating an "autonomous" defense policy and a US drifting toward unilateralism could feed on one another, creating a witches brew that intoxicates temporarily but threatens to leave both sides of the transatlantic bargain with a huge hangover the morning after.

There is nothing invalid about the US motivation to seek a defense against rogue ballistic missile threats. Europe may need to do so as well. There is nothing wrong with European countries trying to produce more effective military output by combining their policy and material input. US interests would benefit from a European partner that could assume serious military burdens. However, the unintended consequences of international policies can be the most important - and threatening - in the long run. If these respective policies are not framed by the overall goal of strengthening the community of interests among the Euro-Atlantic nations, the consequences for the United States and its European allies could be a net loss of security rather than the hoped-for gain.

When the United States looks around the world and asks which countries can help it deal with future international security challenges, it is likely to find mainly European nations that have both the will and capacity to be serious partners. If Europeans look around for allies which broadly share European values and interests, most will conclude that the United States, with all its flaws, will remain the most important, reliable and important world partner for a more united Europe. It is, on occasion, difficult to see this European reality through our allies' frequent complaints about their big power partner. But, particularly in the eyes of the new European democracies in central and Eastern Europe, the transatlantic tie remains essential to European and international security and well-being.

The transatlantic allies need to breathe new life into the sense of common destiny among the Atlantic community of nations. This is a bigger task than simply reaffirming the goal of NATO unity, or avoiding disastrous unilateralist policies. It requires policies that reflect and acknowledge the mutual dependence and shared values that still make the Euro-Atlantic community special. Without such a sense of community, American democracy would be weaker and European integration less secure. European unification, including defense, is an important process for US as well as European interests. However, the United States, Canada and Europe must ensure that the transatlantic community remains healthy and strong, because there is, in the foreseeable future, no reasonable alternative.