No.3. (01/02/23)

Tukish overview on Euroatlantic Security Questions
Ankara, 12-15 December 2000

Turkish officials told 23 Members of the NATO Parliamentari Assembly's Subcommittee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation that Turkey views participation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as essential to its own security because the main areas of instability in and around Europe are in regions of concern to Turkey. During the Sub-Committee visit to Ankara and Incirlik from 12-15 December 2000, government and parliamentary officials were adamant that the European Union must take Turkish concerns into account if ESDP is to rely on NATO assets for EU-led operations.

In addition to meetings in Ankara at the Ministries of Foreign affairs and Defence and the Grand National Assembly, the Subcommittee met with leading Turkish journalists and academics, as well as the U.S. Ambassador. The program also included visits to an army training unit and armoured vehicle factory outside Ankara and the air base at Incirlik.

TURKISH VIEWS ON ESDP

With the visit taking place immediately after the EU's Nice Summit, the focus was mostly on the EU's European Security and Defence Policy and the role that Turkey, a NATO member for almost 50 years, would play in ESDP. Turkish officials indicated that they are amenable to NATO assets being made available for EU operations, but only if Turkey and other non-EU NATO allies have input into the process. As Basat Ozturk, Head of NATO Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, told the Sub-Committee, "It is politically not acceptable for the EU to use NATO assets without asking Turkey's views."

Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu told the Sub-Committee, "We underline that NATO comes first in European security and the transatlantic link must be preserved." Mr Cakmakoglu laid out four points that he said must be taken into account by the EU as it establishes ESDP:

Faruk Logoglu, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, said, "We have not been satisfied by the degree of participation offered by the EU Nice is insufficient. In peacetime, it is not participation, only consultation, and that is not enough. We want to say 'yes' to ESDP, but it must be good enough for Turkey." While Mr Logoglu allowed that the 15 EU members ultimately must make the final decision on whether the EU would act in a crisis, he said that Turkey must be involved in all aspects of the "decision-shaping and decision-making process" leading up to that decision.

Turkish officials said that all NATO members should be involved in such decisions because non-Article 5 missions - those in which the EU might become involved because they do not entail collective defence - can escalate into Article 5 missions if a NATO member is attacked. For example, if the EU were to undertake an operation without the approval of all NATO members, and the adversary attacked a NATO member that participated, the non-EU allies might be compelled to come to their ally's defence without having approved the original mission. Furthermore, Mr Ozturk stated that Turkey does not believe NATO should be limited to Article 5 operations, with the EU handling all other missions, but that NATO and all of its members should be involved in all aspects of European security.

Ali Lutfu Karaosmanoglu, Head of the Foreign Relations Department at Bilikent University, echoed the idea that the Petersberg tasks are not completely separate from collective defence. Professor Karaosmanoglu noted that the Petersberg tasks contain an element of enforcement and the risk of escalation into an Article 5 mission. He said ESDP should result in a coordination of crisis management between the EU and NATO, rather than a separation of roles.

Foreign ministry officials stated that assured access by the EU to NATO planning capabilities is contingent upon assured access of all NATO allies to the planning and preparation of operations in which those NATO capabilities are used. The planning of an operation is important because it defines the rules of engagement and how soldiers protect themselves, "which is highly political." They said that all allies must have a role in matters affecting their vital security interests, and it is not politically acceptable for the EU to use NATO assets without asking Turkish views on the matter at hand. The Foreign ministry officials called for the EU to institute a process similar to that of the WEU, where associate members and observers sit at the same table to discuss issues, but only the full members vote at the end.

Semih Idiz, a prominent Turkish journalist, said that Turkey may seek an "operational veto" over ESDP; in other words, the right to review EU access to NATO assets on a case-by-case basis. He said it was unclear what effect the threatened Turkish veto of NATO-EU cooperation might have on relations between Turkey and the United States, which had requested that Turkey not exercise its veto in this case.

Robert Pearson, U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, said that the United States feels "very strongly that the planning mechanism in NATO needs to be at the disposal of the EU." Ambassador Pearson said this is because planning expertise resides at NATO and "we only have one set of experts." The Ambassador noted Turkey's fear that it might not play a role in deciding how to address an issue that affects Turkish security, adding, "We believe Turkey's concerns should be legitimately addressed so this process goes forward. We believe this is the best time to move forward - waiting won't help." He also noted that ESDP should not contradict NATO; rather, it must be associated with NATO so "we don't send conflicting signals or have conflicting institutions."

In his presentation, the Defence Minister surveyed Turkey's borders and pointed out that most security threats to Europe and potential flashpoints lie in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood, namely in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Cyprus. He noted that Turkey has been a major contributor to European security for 50 years and wants to play an important role in ESDI, to which is able to contribute thanks to its strong armed forces and proximity to potential crisis zones. Noting that Turkey has already made a commitment to the EU's Rapid Reaction Force, he said that Ankara would be willing to increase its contribution if its concerns are addressed. He also made a pitch for continued improvement in Turkish-Greek relations.

Kamran Inan, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Grand National Assembly, expressed anger that Turkey, a long time NATO ally, is playing less of a role in ESDP than the four neutral EU members, who did "nothing" for Western defence in the Cold War.

TURKISH-EU RELATIONS

Salim Yenil, Head of the EU Affairs Office at the Foreign Ministry, told the Subcommittee that Turkey has begun the process of modifying its laws so as to incorporate the "acquis communitaire" of the EU, but Ankara was miffed that EU statements at the Nice Summit failed to acknowledge that Turkey is a candidate for membership. "Is Turkey to be considered a candidate, or are there only 12 candidate countries?" he asked. "Turkey has always wanted to be anchored in the West and has always wanted to be considered for EU membership."

In his presentation and in response to questions, Mr Yenil said that the Turkish government has produced a document - approved by the Prime Minister - that offers a roadmap for adapting Turkish law to conform with EU standards, particularly in the areas of human rights and civilian control of the military, complete with timeframes. He added that the Constitution would be reformed in line with the EU Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, and a special commission has been created to draft the human rights legislation needed to adapt to the "acquis."

Mr Yenil said his government believes that Turkish membership in the EU will not change the EU because the economic changes needed to join the Union will create opportunities at home that will mitigate the need for Turks to emigrate. "Turkey will not rock the boat economically or politically," he said. "But there has been a lot of distrust between Turkey and the EU. Turkey believes the EU doesn't want Turkey; the EU doesn't believe that Turkey can meet the criteria for membership. And Nice was not helpful."

The Grand National Assembly's Mr Inan said that the EU's treatment of Turkey at Nice was "a huge disappointment," with Turkish membership not being considered before 2010. He said that the EU has put "unacceptable preconditions" on Turkish membership, such as resolution of the Cyprus problem, interference in its internal affairs; he was unhappy that some EU members do not treat Turkey as a full candidate for EU membership. Mr Inan said that criticism of the Turkish army's role in political life was unfair because the army has had a special place in the Turkish State since Ottoman times and "the army never wanted to remain in power, but it has intervened to save the nation." He said that the army today is too strong, but it is up to the government to reform itself so that the army need not intervene politically.

Mr Idiz, the journalist, said that the EU's omission of Turkey as a possible member until 2010 has slowed completion of the National Action Plan for EU membership, which was being delayed until after the beginning of 2001. He said this is also due to the difficulty for many Turks in accepting Kurdish rights after the long PKK insurgency. In the end, though, Turkey has no choice but to join the EU, given that 80 percent of its trade is with EU members, he said.

Ersin Kalaycioglu, a professor at Bosphorus University, noted that the EU and Turkey have common economic interests, but relations were first strained in 1984 because of the heavy-handed response by Ankara in responding to PKK attacks in the Kurdish region of South-Eastern Turkey. Later, Turkey's exclusion from EU candidacy while the candidacies of former Communist countries were recognised, was interpreted by Turks as nothing more than racism.

Professor Kalaycioglu said that the weakness of the Turkish political system is that "it does not know how to deal with advocacy groups," especially those of a religious or ethnic nature. He said that "crackdowns" on such groups tend to be arbitrary and distinctions are often not drawn between terrorism and legitimate expression. "The problem is not democracy; it is the rule of law." Professor Kalaycioglu said. He reinforced Mr Inan's comments about civil-military relations, noting that a strong government would be needed to limit the role of the military, but the current weak coalition is not in such a position.

REGIONAL SECURITY

Mr Inan referred to instability near Turkey's borders, such as Russian troops in Georgia, the ongoing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey is also trying to use its ties to both Israel and the Palestinians to help bring about peace. Mr Inan said Turkey is attempting to convince Russia that Ankara is not looking to challenge Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but rather is working to complement Russian efforts to develop democracy and economic reform in the region. Professor Karaosmanoglu saw this as part of Turkey's foreign policy aim of trying to spread Western values to those regions, reinforcing its own Western orientation. Professor Kalaycioglu noted that because of its historical ties to these regions, Turkey finds itself involved in crises there by default.

On the subject of missile defence, Professor Karaosmanoglu noted that Turkey is already within range of missiles from Iran, Iraq and Syria, and other countries in Southern Europe would soon be in the same position. Having renounced weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Turkey is left with two possible responses: 1. Acquire its own missiles with conventional warheads, which would alarm Greece and add to regional tensions; or 2. Acquire Theater Missile Defense (TMD). He said TMD is the only viable option for Turkey, and he mentioned that Ankara is in discussions with the United States and Israel to acquire a TMD system.

(Report by NATO Parliamentary Assembly)