No. 31 (10/11/00)

Secretary General's Speech at the ATA General Assembly
Budapest, 31 October 2000
"The six principles of partnership" (extract)

In general, there are six main principles guiding NATO's partnerships and each of these principles is translated into concrete arrangements. First and foremost, Partnership should be as broad and inclusive as possible. That principle is what guides NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Through these, NATO is today the dynamo at the hub of a new set of profound security relationships across the continent. Forty six countries - NATO members, former Warsaw Pact countries, ex-Soviet Republics, and neutrals, including Switzerland which is not even in the United Nations - now train and exercise together, discuss security issues together and even carry out peacekeeping operations together.

The value of this inclusive framework is very clear. Every country in Europe has a structure through which they can enhance their security interests. No small, rigid regional alliances are necessary. No unilateral solutions are required. Through PfP and EAPC, security across Europe has been structured towards inclusion and cooperation. European countries who chose a new path are included in Euro-Atlantic institutions. That alone is a massive change from the past, and another major contribution to the stability of the continent.

The second principle of Partnership is that it should be flexible. With so many countries in Europe - some old democracies, some new, and all with different security traditions and backgrounds - nothing else could succeed. PfP and EAPC are designed to accommodate these different needs and different speeds. Indeed, Partnership has evolved dramatically form its early days, when it was essentially a one-way street whereby NATO would help its former adversaries with their post-communist transition. That soon changed. More and more countries came in, many of which would bring tremendously valuable peacekeeping experience to the table. So Partnership evolved into a two-way street. Partner countries would gain from NATO experience in defence planning, defence budgeting, or establishing sound civil-military relations. NATO would benefit by spreading the burden of managing European

security on more shoulders. And as our cooperative mechanisms have evolved over the course of one decade, the opportunities for Partner countries to influence and shape this evolution has constantly increased. We are a long way from the early days, when NATO would offer a menu of activities from which Partner countries could choose. Today, Partner countries know that it is they who decide how far and how deep co-operation can and should go. It is they who share the responsibility for the future of these endeavours. That is why they have remained interested -- and active.

The third principle of Partnership is that it should be targeted. Successful partnership with some countries required special relationships, because of their political importance, or the extent of the cooperation both parties wanted. That is why NATO has special relationships with Russia and Ukraine. Both countries occupy important strategic positions in Europe. Their evolution affects European security and stability in profound ways. So NATO entered into more focused partnerships with these two countries, to work more closely with them, and to help them with their post-Communist transition as effectively as possible. The NATO-Russia relationship is clearly the most challenging of our Partnerships. Today, after the Kosovo "ice age", our cooperation is picking up momentum again. But getting back to the status quo before Kosovo is not enough. We should aim higher. We should aim for a relationship where disagreement in one area does lead to a breakdown of our entire cooperation. The NATO-Russia Council should be seen as a forum where differences can be aired. It should not merely be a consultative body for use in fair weather. Such a "crisis-resilient" relationship would not only befit the strategic importance of Russia and NATO. It would be a strategic advantage for all of Europe. And, in my view, such a relationship - a true Partnership - can be achieved.

The fourth principle of Partnership is that it should be practical. It must be more than a talk shop. It must also prepare all participants to work together when it counts, and where it counts -- on the ground, managing crises. This principle has paid off in spades in the Balkans. Indeed, if anything has demonstrated the real value of Partnership beyond any doubt, it has been Bosnia and Kosovo. In early 1994, after observing one of the first PfP exercises, a British journalist heavily criticised PfP as being a showpiece. In his view, the entire set-up of the exercise was unrealistic: American and Central European soldiers working together as peacekeepers in Europe - what an absurd notion! Well, less then two years later, IFOR deployed into Bosnia - with troops from NATO and from many Partner nations. While some were still scoffing at Partnership as a cheap public relations trick, the realities in the Balkans were already giving us the answer: not only is Partnership necessary, but indispensable. It has acquired a strategic value of its own.

In Kosovo, the value of Partnership became even more obvious. The political support of Partner countries was absolutely crucial. And Partner countries gave us the support we asked of them -- despite the fact that some of them faced considerable political risks and economic hardships. In the most critical moment of NATO's history, Partner countries were there. They demonstrated that they were ready, willing and able to stand shoulder to shoulder with NATO, and make a real contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. And the fact that some countries are more and more ready and willing to make a contribution to Euro-Atlantic security lies at the heart of the fifth principle of partnership: that partnership must not only broaden, but also deepen. In other words, Partnership must offer, for some, the road to full membership in the NATO.

The rationale is very clear. Enlargement is Partnership at its deepest level. Where security is shared completely. Where defence planning is fully integrated among members. Where joint exercises are routine. Where all security issues are discussed together as a matter of course, and common solutions are the preferred option. If democratic states want to join NATO; if they are able and willing to contribute to the security of the Alliance; and if their membership in NATO enhances Euro-Atlantic security; then the Alliance must remain flexible enough to consider their membership. Indeed, for these countries, membership is simply the logical conclusion of ever-deeper partnership.

Nine countries are currently asking for NATO membership -- nine countries eager to emulate the successful path chosen by our three most recent members. We cannot promise them a timetable for accession, nor guarantee them membership. But we will not keep one half of Europe at arm's length forever. That is why keeping NATO's door open remains a strategic imperative. Why some Partner countries will become members. And why we are helping them to better prepare themselves for eventual membership. Because in this new Europe, geography is no longer destiny.